

SECRET

25X1A9a

Official Diary

Monday, 16 February 1953

1. After chatting with [REDACTED] 25X1A9a briefed Mr. Dulles in preparation for the AE meeting at the White House on the following points:

25X1X7

a. Made available the most recent semi-annual AE estimate together with the supplement respecting [REDACTED] 25X1X7

b. Passed to Mr. Dulles, and explained, [REDACTED] 25X1A9a supplementary memorandum indicating the three primary bases of the AE estimate and the variation in their reliability.

c. With respect to [REDACTED] 25X1X7 informed Mr. Dulles that it was not possible to generalize by stating that the favorable result of the recent collaboration meant that an increase of collaboration in the future would produce corresponding advantages. In the event [REDACTED] additional collaboration (and we felt assured that they would) 25X1X7 each specific proposal would have to be judged on its merits.

25X1A9a

25X1C10b

d. Outlined for Mr. Dulles the substance of the AE briefing at [REDACTED] office and emphasized its significance with respect to the whole AE problem and with respect to our [REDACTED] 25X1C10b

25X1A9a

2. At the morning meeting Mr. Dulles informed me that we should be prepared to give a briefing to Mr. Stevenson in advance of his forthcoming trip. In this relation, I requested that in any contact with Mr. Stevenson an attempt be made to obtain his date of departure and itinerary. I have requested [REDACTED] to pass this information to O/CI.

3. At the morning meeting Mr. Dulles mentioned that Sinclair Weeks, the new Secretary of Commerce, was extremely interested in the figures on China trade, according to [REDACTED] FOIA b6 He requested Mr. Amory and myself to see that Mr. Weeks was briefed. This could be the substance of the briefing we recently gave Mr. Cutler and I undertook to have this done.

25X1A9a

4. At the morning meeting I called attention to the recent intelligence respecting Guatemala and raised the question of whether this would not be an appropriate time to request policy direct from State Department. If the United States did not act covertly in this matter there was a reasonable possibility that certain other South American countries would do so. As a matter of fact, they might do so in any event if they receive an indication that such action would not be disapproved of by the United States. Mr. Dulles indicated that this matter was receiving attention at the highest levels and should be thoroughly covered in his briefing for the NSC. I later phoned [REDACTED] and requested that this point be dealt with fully. Mr. Dulles also expressed a desire to have [REDACTED] 25X1A9a present at his pre-briefing at 5:30 PM today and I later spoke to [REDACTED] about this. 25X1A9a

5. Mr. Dulles indicated that when the Secretary of State had spoken to the President with respect to the Iranian situation there were three issues on which there seemed to be some question, namely:

- a. The volume of oil supplies presently available in Iran (e.g. in tanks at Abadan, etc.)
- b. Whether or not the Iranians were refining enough for their local needs, and
- c. Whether there was enough shipping available to move substantial quantities of Iranian oil (exclusive of Soviet bloc shipping and exclusive of shipping committed by the major companies to move other oil).

With respect to the foregoing, I commented that my off-hand impression was that there were substantial supplies of oil in Iran, but that Alton Jones' report led me to raise some question as to whether they were able at present to supply their lubricating oil needs because of certain breakdowns in the plant. With respect to shipping, I reserved comment since the Jones report had not indicated that there was much available. Later contacted [redacted] and [redacted] of O/RR (in the absence of both Amory and [redacted] and posed these questions. When they pointed out that these facts were primary responsibilities of other agencies (not being Soviet bloc) I suggested that they obtain the necessary data from these other agencies as a current intelligence function. Later informed Mr. Dulles that we would probably have to obtain these facts from other agencies and I shall warn him to make this clear when passing the information to Secretary of State or the President.

25X1A9a  
25X1A9a  
5X1A9a

6. Attended ADS meeting 25X1X7

7. Spoke by phone with [redacted] and suggested that he would be well advised to make inquiry respecting any plans for a tripartite or five-power meeting on Southeast Asia. A corresponding meeting had caused a considerable flap within the intelligence committee last year and, although intelligence could not control the timing of a policy meeting, it could needle the policy makers from time to time for some advance notice so as to be able to make adequate preparations. General [redacted] indicated that he would do this.

25X1X7

8. At the request of Admiral Espe, made arrangements for Admiral [redacted] to meet with Mr. Dulles and myself at 3:00 PM on 12 March for about an hour.

25X1A9a  
9. [redacted] phoned and inquired whether or not the IAC agencies had reversed their position with respect to the desirability of an oil suit in the light of National Security. I assured him that they had not, although they had conceded that the outcry which had been anticipated had not developed with the same intensity that was originally estimated. I indicated that I would call this to the attention of those who had expressed a contrary point of view. This was done.

(cont'd)

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

Official Diary  
16 February 1953

10. <sup>25X1A9a</sup> ~~SECRET~~ by phone concurred in having <sup>25X1A9a</sup> ~~SECRET~~ participate in the intelligence briefing to be given for senior officials of the IAC agencies. He will cover FI activities.

11. Attended special meeting of USCIB called by General Partridge.

12. Attended briefing of Mr. Dulles in preparation for the NSC meeting on Wednesday. Mr. Amory and myself briefed Mr. Dulles respecting the substantive items.

<sup>25X1A9a</sup> ~~SECRET~~  


~~SECRET~~

Security Information